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 An observational study of bail decision-making  
Abstract 
Pretrial detention of defendants has important legal, human rights and practical implications 
for defendants, their families, and society and therefore the area justifies research scrutiny.  
However, there is a dearth of empirical studies of bail decision-making and most of them 
have been retrospective studies.  Prior studies have nevertheless identified a number of 
purported shortcomings in bail legislation and decision-making.   The rarely used 
observational methodology employed in this study provided data that is not normally 
available from official records.  The first appearances of 648 defendants were observed in the 
lower courts in metropolitan Perth (Western Australia) to identify factors that play a 
significant role in bail decision-making and to collect baseline data for a longitudinal study.  
Legal factors made a significant contribution to the bail decision, while extra-legal factors did 
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Legal (Friedland, 1965) and human rights (Law Commission, 1999) principles dictate that 
defendants should not be detained before their trial without a just cause.  In some jurisdictions 
there is a presumption in favour of bail1, even a right to bail (Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Roden, 
1981).  However, such a presumption or right is not universally accepted2 and in some 
jurisdictions there is a presumption against bail in certain situations (see Bamford, King, & 
Sarre, 1999) and pretrial detention has effectively become preventative detention (Goldkamp 
& Gottfredson, 1993).  Even where there is a right to bail it is never an absolute right and in 
all jurisdictions bail may be refused when considered necessary to ensure the effective 
operation of the criminal justice system.  Bail will, for example, be curtailed where there is a 
risk that the defendant will fail to appear at later court proceedings, will commit crimes, will 
interfere with the proceedings or poses a risk to victims or the safety of the public 
(Hannaford, 1991; Kellough & Wortley, 2002).   
For some defendants who expect to serve a custodial sentence the refusal of bail may be 
of little consequence as they may prefer to serve as much time as possible on remand (where 
they have more privileges and circumstances are sometimes more comfortable than when 
serving a sentence).  In some jurisdictions the time defendants are in remand custody may 
also be subtracted from their subsequent sentence (Fitzgerald & Marshall, 1999).   However, 
for most defendants and their families refusal of bail has far reaching legal, financial, physical 
and emotional consequences (King, 1973).  Firstly, research findings suggest that there is, if 
all other things are equal, a relationship between pretrial detention and the outcome of a case.  
For example, all other things being equal, defendants on remand in custody are more likely to 
plead guilty (Bottomley, 1970), more likely to be found guilty (Clifford, 1979; Ebbesen & 
Konecni, 1975; Foote, Markle, & Wolley, 1954; Friedland, 1965; Kellough & Wortley, 2002; 
Myers & Reid, 1995; Robertshaw, 1991), and more likely to be given a custodial sentence 
(Clifford & Wilkins, 1976; Ebbesen & Konecni, 1975; Friedland, 1965; Kellough & Wortley, 
2002.   
Secondly, defendants who are not granted bail at their first appearance may lose their 
employment and accommodation and this may have major implications for them at various 
 3
                                            
1 Though often viewed as a choice between remand in custody or on bail, the bail-decision is 
not a dichotomous choice, but is essentially a three-tiered process (Nagel, 1983).  The first 
question is whether the defendants should be released, and if the answer is affirmative, the 
next question is whether to set conditions.  If the answer to that question is affirmative, the 
final question is what form the bail conditions should take.   
 
2 In Western Australia (WA) defendants do not have such a right, but subclause 2(2) of Part C 
of Schedule I of the Bail Act (1982) provides that children have a qualified right to bail. 
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levels.  For example, it may weaken the likelihood of obtaining bail later during the process, 
or of paying the bail or surety amount if bail is later granted later.  Unemployed remandees 
are also less likely to be able to pay a fine if one is imposed.  On discharge from prison their 
reintegration in society will also be much more difficult if they do not have employment or 
accommodation to return to.   
Thirdly, being in custody reduces the likelihood that defendants will be able to afford 
legal representation, but even those defendants on remand in custody who can afford legal 
representation will be disadvantaged.  The fees of a lawyer will likely be higher when the 
defendant is in prison as additional time and costs are involved in, for example, travelling to 
prison to consult the defendant.  The lawyer will often also have to undertake tasks, such as 
finding witnesses, that a remandee on bail could see to personally (Friedland, 1965).  It is also 
likely that lawyers will spend less time with a defendant on remand in custody than they 
would with one who is not in custody.   
Fourthly, detained remandees are more at risk of physical and sexual assaults and of 
contracting communicable diseases (Barry, 1997).  For example, people who are remanded in 
custody for the first time, display a higher prevalence of self-harm and suicide (Backett, 1988; 
Dear, Thomson, Hall, & Howells, 1998; Liebling, 1992, 1994).  
Finally, detention is stigmatising and can erode remandees’ family and community ties. 
The impact is likely greater for Indigenous people who may be “remanded in custody far from 
home, community, and even Language and Skin group” (Fitzgerald & Marshall, 1999, p. 5).  
The family of a person in detention also suffers emotionally and financially (King, 1973) and 
at a practical level may find visiting the defendants in prison upsetting, inconvenient and 
expensive.   
Society is also affected by the refusal to grant bail, especially at a financial level.   
Defendants awaiting trial in detention contribute to the size of the populations in adult prisons 
(Bamford et al., 1999; Carcach & Huntley, 2002) and juvenile remand centres (Jones, 1999).  
In Barry’s study in Western Australia (WA) adult remandees were found to stay in custody 
for an average of about 16 days, with some staying as long as 165 days (Barry, 1997), and 
sometimes for minor offences.  This places a financial burden on taxpayers (Barry, 1997) 
which is aggravated by the fact that most defendants do not earn taxable income while on 
remand in custody.  In addition, the State must often provide services and support to the 
defendants’ family (Fitzgerald & Marshall, 1999).  From a societal perspective, there is also 
the concern that remand prisons serve as schools of crime by exposing innocent people and 
petty criminals who later receive non-custodial sentences, to hardened criminals (Fitzgerald, 
1997; O'Malley, Coventry, & Walters, 1993).  Remand prisoners are likely to be more prone 
 4
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to negative influences than they may otherwise be, as they are in most jurisdictions excluded 
from offending behaviour programs or other constructive activities and complain of boredom 
(Bottomley, 1970; Dear et al., 1998; King, 1973).   
 
Criticism of bail legislation and decision-making 
Given these legal, human rights and practical implications it is not surprising that bail 
legislation and decision-making have been subject to critical review for about the last half 
century.    
Psychologists contend that bail legislation is vague, constructs are ill-defined and silent 
on exactly what information magistrates3 should use and how that information should be 
weighted and integrated (Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Goldkamp & Gottfredson, 1979). While 
magistrates do not necessarily follow the legislation strictly (see Nagel, 1983), researchers 
have found that they generally apply the relevant provisions (Hucklesby, 1996; Konecni & 
Ebbesen, 1984; Morgan & Henderson, 1998).  Nevertheless, inconsistencies found among 
magistrates that cannot be fully explained by the differences in the relevant cases, suggest that 
extra-legal factors (i.e. factors not specifically prescribed in the relevant statutory law, Nagel, 
1983) may play a role (see for example Gordon, Bindrim, McNicholas, & Walden, 1988; 
Myers & Reid, 1995).  At one level this is inevitable because bail decision-making involves 
the exercise of discretion and subjective factors will therefore play a role (Clifford & Wilkins, 
1976).  This can be due to what Nagel (1983) calls bench bias, that is the tendency of 
particular magistrates “to prefer some kinds of outcomes to others regardless of case 
characteristics” (p. 506).  However, inconsistencies between magistrates could also be due to 
social bias that involves the systematic discrimination against a specific group or groups of 
people.  It is the latter that is of the greatest concern.  In the case of bail, personal 
characteristics such as age (Morgan & Henderson, 1998), gender (Bernat, 1984; Bottoms & 
McClean, 1976; Hucklesby, 1996; Kruttschnitt, 1984; Steury & Frank, 1990), demeanor 
(Petee, 1994) and race of defendants (Barry, 1997; Bernat, 1984; Morgan & Henderson, 1998; 
Petee, 1994) have been identified as factors that may play a role.  Other factors that may 
influence bail decision-making include social status (Unnever, 1982), community ties 
(VanNostrand, 2000), familial relationship (Herzberger & Channels, 1991), and geographical 
location, such as whether the relevant court is situated in an urban or rural area (Bottomley, 
1970).  However, the findings in respect of some of these factors are not consistent (Brown, 
1998; Nagel, 1983; Spohn, 1995).   
 5
                                            
3 The term magistrate will be consistently used to refer to bail decision-makers because this 
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From a social psychological perspective it would not be surprising if magistrates whose 
large case loads force them to make fast decisions4, make biased decisions (Saks & Hastie, 
1986).  Under such conditions people tend to use mental short cuts (Davis & Davis, 1996; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1971; 1974) and focus on a minimum of information, usually one or 
two factors (Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999).  While these shortcuts are usually effective 
(Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999), they could introduce bias in the decision-making process, e.g. the 
representativeness  heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971; 1974).  The use of fast and frugal 
heuristics may, at least partly, explain why the opinion of the prosecutor5 has, independent 
from other factors, consistently been shown to be strongly predictive of judicial bail decisions 
(Bamford et al., 1999; Bottomley, 1970; Friedland, 1965; Hucklesby, 1996; King, 1973; 
Konecni & Ebbesen, 1984; Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Petee, 1994).  Another possible 
explanation for the strong relationship between magistrates’ bail decisions and the opinions of 
police and prosecutors, is that the bulk of bail decisions are made at a very early stage of the 
judicial process when most of the available information will be coming from the police.  
Especially when defendants are unrepresented6 they are often so confused, distressed or 
ignorant that they fail to provide information that could influence the decision the magistrate 
makes (Astor, 1986; Bottoms & McClean, 1976; Dell, 1971; Friedland, 1965; King, 1973).  
Dhami and Ayton (2001) further believe that the sequence in which information is presented 
in a typical bail application may not be conducive to effective decision-making.   
 Nor do magistrates have much opportunity to learn from experience because they 
receive no formal, and little informal, feedback about the appropriateness of their bail 
decisions (Dhami & Ayton, 2001).  The informal feedback that they receive will often be in 
the form of biased and negative media coverage when something went wrong, such as when a 
remandee on bail offends (see Hucklesby & Marshall, 2000).  Consequently it is possible that 
magistrates may be overly cautious when considering bail (Davies cited by King, 1973) 
because of the visibility, and potential grave consequences for society, if defendants offend 
while on bail (Brown, 1998; Fitzgerald & Marshall, 1999; Hucklesby & Marshall, 2000; 
Morgan & Henderson, 1998), fail to appear (Auditor General of Western Australia, 1997; 
 6
                                            
4 Dhami and Ayton found the duration of bail hearings can range from 50 seconds to 62 
minutes, with an average of six minutes (2001; also see Bamford et al., 1999; King 1973). 
 
5 Most bail legislation provides that magistrates must have regard to the grounds put forward 
by the prosecution, however, this is only one of a number of factors they should take into 
account. 
 
6 Not surprisingly the literature suggests that legal representation at the bail hearings may be 
of considerable importance and that unrepresented defendants may be disadvantaged (Barry, 
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Fitzgerald & Marshall, 1999) or interfere with witnesses (Fitzgerald & Marshall, 1999).  It is 
therefore hardly surprising that the information used by magistrates may predict which 
offenders are most likely to offend while on bail, rather than which offenders will fail to 
attend their hearing (see for example Morgan and Henderson, 1998). 
More controversial is the allegation that the police, prosecution and judiciary 
deliberately use bail for ulterior purposes.  The first allegation is that authorities engage in 
what King (1973) aptly called bail bargaining, in order to obtain guilty pleas, confessions or 
information in return for bail (Astor, 1986; Bottoms & McClean, 1976; Friedland, 1965; 
Kellough & Wortley, 2002).  It has been suggested that because defendants are typically 
bewildered in the early stages of the judicial process and ignorant of their rights they, 
especially those who believe they have a reasonable chance of being given a non-custodial 
sentence, are likely to plead guilty to get out of prison, regardless of the strength of their case 
or whether they are, in fact, innocent (Kraszlan & Thomson, 1998a; 1998b).  It is secondly 
alleged that bail may be refused to give defendants, especially younger people, a taster of a 
custodial sentence (King, 1973) or to punish them in lieu of a short custodial sentence where 
they would not be imprisoned due to sentencing legislation (Barry, 1997).  However, King 
concedes it is difficult to prove or disprove that this actually takes place.   
Finally, authors have identified a number of specific instances where the lack of legal 
representation may affect whether bail is granted (Barry, 1997; Bernat, 1984; Hucklesby, 
1996; King, 1973).  For example, King (1973) reported that there is a statistical difference 
between the number of represented and unrepresented defendants’ cases that are remanded for 
a sentencing report, and that defendants who had legal representation were less likely to be 
remanded in custody. In King’s study the same proportion of unrepresented as represented 
defendants received bail, but when he considered only those cases where the police opposed 
bail (generally the more serious offences) slightly more represented than unrepresented 
defendants received bail. He believed that this finding would have been more pronounced if it 
was not that there are factors that sometimes restrict lawyers from making bail applications at 
the first appearance of a defendant.  These include that they may not know the reasons why 
bail is refused until the hearing and may therefore not be prepared to proceed with the 
application.  After taking into account a number of other factors King concluded that 
“representation at the bail hearings may be of considerable importance” (p. 31). In Dietrich v. 
The Queen (1992) the High Court of Australia acknowledged that there is a risk that 
unrepresented defendants charged with serious criminal offences will not receive a fair trial.  
Implicit in this, although not stated explicitly, is that unrepresented defendants may be 
disadvantaged because of the imbalance of power, resources and legal knowledge as they face 
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compounded as they have less access to free legal and paralegal services available from 
community organisations, libraries or friends and relatives than those to whom bail was 
granted.  
 
Research in bail decision-making 
Despite the criticism directed at bail decision-making since the 1960s it has not attracted 
much empirical research (Bamford et al., 1999; Fitzgerald & Marshall, 1999).  Moreover, 
from an Australian perspective, it is important to note that much of the relevant research was 
undertaken in the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK).  Given the differences 
in, for example, legal rules, procedures, cultural and geographical factors between different 
jurisdictions it is not always appropriate to generalise the findings of bail research in one 
jurisdiction to other jurisdictions (Dhami & Ayton, 2001).    
There has also been a dearth of empirical research in WA with the exception of research 
by Barry (1997) and Bamford and his colleagues (1999).  Barry did a retrospective study of 
offenders who were given non-custodial sentences by magistrates over a 6 month charge 
period and found that 53% (221) of offenders on remand in custody received a non-custodial 
sentence.  She investigated this group of 221 and a random sample (n = 273) of those who 
were at liberty in the community prior to receiving a non-custodial sentence.  A larger 
proportion of Indigenous offenders spent time in remand custody (37%) than at liberty in the 
community (13%), while a larger proportion of non-Indigenous offenders spent time at liberty 
in the community (87%) than in remand custody (63%).  (These differences were statistically 
significant.)  For more than half of the 221 remanded in custody, it was the first time they had 
been in prison, in fact 14% had no previous criminal history.  The majority (68%) were 
remanded without bail, while the rest were granted bail but were unable to meet the 
conditions 
Bamford and his colleagues (1999) set out to identify the factors that may influence the 
processes and rates of adult remand in custody which may contribute to variation in remand 
rates in jurisdictions.  They compared Victoria, South Australia and WA and found that there 
were significant differences between these jurisdictions.  They were, however, not able to 
isolate any single factor that explains this difference. 
Neither of these studies examined the position of young defendants.  There is in fact a 
lack of prospective, especially longitudinal, bail studies that focus on young defendants 
internationally (Varma, 2002).  The lack of bail studies that examine younger  
defendants as a separate group is striking considering that in 1999-2000, for example, “the 
offending rate for persons aged 15-19 years was six times the offender rate for the remainder 
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decision-making process is broadly similar for both juvenile and adult defendants, and many 
of the decision-makers and other stakeholders are the same people, there are very important 
differences as well.  Varma points out that juveniles require special protection within the legal 
system because of their immaturity and dependency.  For example, they are usually dependent 
on other people to ensure that they attend their trial and desist from committing further 
offences if released. They may, furthermore, be less able to understand the criminal 
proceedings, the justice process and their rights (Scott & Grisso, 1998)7.   
The aim of the project that forms the subject of this paper was to identify factors that 
predict the granting or refusal of bail in the Magistrates’ Courts, Courts of Petty Sessions and 
the Children’s Court in metropolitan Perth8 at defendants’ first appearances and to collect 






The first appearance of 648 defendants in seven different courts in metropolitan Perth was 
observed on 138 court days9.  Most of the defendants (579) appeared in adult courts, and 69 in 
the Children’s Court.  The ages of the defendants involved ranged from 11 to 72 years, with 
about two thirds aged between 18 and 32 years.  As expected the vast majority of defendants 
were male (80.6%), but a noticeably smaller percentage of the juveniles were male (69.6%).  
Another notable difference between the juvenile and adults samples was that only 23.8% of 
adult defendants were Indigenous compared to 47.8% of juvenile defendants.  
 
Materials 
A data collection instrument was developed that was based on information collected during 
the literature review, statutory factors in the Bail Act (1982) and Regulations (1988), and 
input from various stakeholders within the WA Department of Justice and a preliminary 
 9
                                            
7 The WA Bail Act (1982) appropriately does distinguish between adults and juveniles. 
 
8 WA is a sparsely populated state that is about the size of Western Europe, but has a 
population of about 2 million people of whom roughly two thirds live in the Perth 
metropolitan area.  Like the rest of Australia its courts are arranged in a three tier hierarchy.  
The courts of summary jurisdiction, i.e. the Courts of Petty Sessions, Magistrates’ Courts and 
the Children’s Courts are at the lowest tier.  The presiding officers in these courts are called 
magistrates and the prosecutors are generally members of the police service.   
 
9 Courtroom observational studies are not amenable to random sampling. 
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investigation by members of the research team. The initial instrument was amended after it 
had been used during pilot testing and the training of the observers. 
The bail decision (the dependant variable) was recorded as well as a range of 
independent variables.  These included socio-demographic variables, legal representation (i.e. 
any assistance of a legal nature that the defendant received), arguments by defendants10 and 
prosecutors (i.e. any comment in respect of a factor relevant to bail made by prosecutors, 
defendants or on behalf of defendants by legal representatives), magistrate reasons (i.e. any 
verbal reason offered, or comment made, by a magistrate in court to justify or explain the bail 
decision) and other court and offence variables. 
 
Procedure  
The three observers were trained and independently rated the same bail applications during 
the training period to enhance inter-observer reliability.  The observers attended specific 
courts on predetermined days and remained in court for the duration of proceedings for that 
day.  They observed all the first appearances that took place on the specific day. 
Courtroom observation was used despite it being a time consuming method of 
collecting information because it is such a rich source of data to work with in terms of 
understanding the qualitative factors thought to be involved in decision-making (Varma, 
2002).  Moreover, the information recorded in this fashion approximates the information that 
presiding magistrates have when making a bail decision.   
Charge numbers11 were recorded in order to be able to verify the data recorded on the 
survey instruments and obtain missing data (e.g. date of birth of the defendants), from court 
private lists.  No names were encoded in the database. 
As first appearances of defendants in WA are as a rule in person, none of the first 
appearances observed by the research team used closed circuit television.  
 
Statistical analysis 
Preliminary chi-square tests of significance and analysis of variance techniques were used to 
determine the association between the bail decision and a number of variables.    Logistic 
regression (logit) techniques were used to determine which variables make a significant 
independent contribution to granting or refusal of  bail.  A dichotomous variable for the bail 
 10
                                            
10 Section 23 of the Bail Act provides that defendants are not bound to give any information 
on a bail application and evidence given by defendants are not admissible against them on the 
trial of the offence (section 25).  
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decision (granted/not granted) was used as the dependent variable. Unless otherwise stated, an 
alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests.   
 
Results 
While 5.6% of the defendants attended court on a summons or notice, most were in custody 
when they first appeared (91.4%) and 31.6% had been arrested on a bench warrant12. 
Defendants were charged with offences ranging from murder to non-compliance with an 
order to report to the Juvenile Justice Team, and 50.6% of the offences were either property  
or violent offences.  The maximum number of charges was 65, but 27.2% of the defendants  
had only one charge against them.  Almost half (45.1%) were charged for at least one serious 
(as defined in Schedule 213 of the Bail Act, 1982) offence.  In 51.5% of cases there were also  
other orders such as a prior bail, parole and conditional orders that may have influenced the 
bail decision (see Table 1).   In respect of Children’s Court cases, the presence of a 
responsible person was recorded for 52.2% of the defendants.    
 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
All the juveniles and 92.7% of the adults in this study had some form of legal 
representation (See Table 1).  Bail was mostly considered after an application by or on behalf 
of the defendants (61.3%), but in some cases after it was mentioned by the prosecutor (1.2%) 
or magistrate (9.3%).  In total 374 defendants were granted bail, that is for 72.3% of juvenile 
and 57.8% of adult defendants.   
Prosecutor arguments, defence arguments and magistrate reasons included many 
different arguments and reasons.  Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the chi-square results of those 
arguments and reasons significantly associated with the bail decision, and/or with a frequency 
of 10 or more.  Many of the argument and reason variables had low frequencies and the 
results are less robust and more susceptible to the influence of outliers in those cases.                                               
 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 11
                                            
12 A warrant issued under the Justices Act (1902) for the apprehension of a defendant who 
failed to appear at the time and place mentioned in the recognizance. 
 
13 Schedule 2 offences generally involve physical harm, burglary or theft of valuable items.  
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In cases where the prosecutor did not oppose bail, 90.1% of defendants were granted 
bail, compared to 59.3% of all defendants. The prosecutor was opposed to bail in 60% of 
cases, and submitted arguments in 54% of cases.  There were 25 prosecutor argument 
variables, including no argument, but as Table 2 shows, the bail decision is likely to be 
affected by only 5 of them.  The percentage of defendants refused bail was significantly 
higher than the average of 40.7% for bail refused, when the prosecutor submitted no 
argument (45.7%) or when the prosecutor’s arguments included the following: an existing 
order (64.5%); a likelihood of reoffending (64.7%); outstanding offences being serious or 
numerous (63.2%); or poor character (80%). 
 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Arguments were submitted on behalf of 347 represented defendants (62.2% of all 
represented defendants) and 15 unrepresented defendants (33.3% of all unrepresented 
defendants).  Of all defendants who submitted an argument, 50% were granted bail while two 
thirds of those who did not submit an argument were granted bail.  There were 28 defence 
argument variables, including no argument, but as Table 3 shows the bail decision is likely to 
be affected by only 6 of them.  The percentage of defendants granted bail was significantly 
higher than the average of 59.3% for bail granted when the defendants argued that they were 
able to obtain a surety (66.7 %) and when defendants argued that the present offence was not 
serious (85.7%).  The percentage of defendants refused bail was significantly higher than the 
average of 40.7% for bail refused, when there was no argument (50.4%) or when the 
defendants’ arguments included the following: other comments sympathetic to the 
defendants’ case such as going through detoxification (52.5%); the defendant was under the 
influence of drugs at the time of the offence (56.8%); or there were exceptional circumstances 
such as the defendants facing financial loss if bail is refused (72.2%).   
 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
There were 24 magistrate reason variables, including no reason, but Table 4 shows that 
the bail decision is likely to be affected by only 7 of them.  The percentage who were granted 
bail was significantly higher than the average of 59.3% for bail granted, when the magistrate 
did not mention any reason (63.1%).   The percentage of defendants refused bail was 
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included the following categories: any other comments (66.3%); the seriousness of the 
offence(s) (57.5%); previous breach of bail (54.4%); violation of existing orders (67.3%); the 
likelihood of reoffending (84.0%); or drug use (100%). 
A closer analysis of the data reveals that there were 103 instances with no formal 
application, argument or comments by or on behalf of the defendants, no argument or 
comments by the prosecution, and where the magistrates provided no reasons for their 
decisions.  Seventy-seven of these defendants, that is 11.9% of the total sample, were not 
granted bail while bail was granted in 4.5% of first hearings without being mentioned by 
anybody. 
Logistic regression techniques were used to determine which variables make a 
significant independent contribution to granting or refusal of bail.  The results are provided in 
Table 5 for both the Children’s Court and Adult Courts.    
 
Table 5 about here 
 
In the Children’s Court model only the variable number of charges had a coefficient 
that was significant.  Bail was less likely to be granted, the greater the number of charges.  
The explanatory power of this model is poor with a Nagelkerke R2 of 24.2%.  
The logistic regression results suggest that bail is significantly related to a number of 
factors for All Courts.  Relative to the benchmark case14, bail is significantly less likely to be 
granted if any reasons are given by the magistrate; orders apply (prior bail, parole and other 
orders); no formal bail application is made; the defendant is attending the bail hearing in 
custody; there is a Schedule 2 offence and/or there are a large number of charges.  Bail is 
significantly more likely to be granted if the defendant has legal representation; has a bench 
warrant in place; there has been a breach of bail; and/or the prosecutor is unopposed to bail.  
The All Courts model explains 63.8% of the variation in the bail decision.    
The Adult Courts model explains 68.7% of the variation in the bail decision and is very 
similar to the All Courts model15.  However, a Schedule 2 offence and a breach of bail do not 
make a significant contribution to the bail decision in the Adult Courts model.  Furthermore 
 13
                                            
14 In the benchmark case there is no defence or prosecutor argument and no magistrate reason, 
the defendant is male, non-Indigenous, aged over 47 years, has no prior orders, is not legally 
represented, makes a formal bail application, did not breach bail, is not accused of a Schedule 
2 offence, is not in custody, did not have hearing adjourned for legal advice, has a male 
magistrate, has only one charge, is not married, does not have a bench warrant and the  
prosecutor is opposing bail. 
 
15 The high explanatory power for the All Courts and Adults Courts models reflects some 
endogeneity.  This is not unexpected as the decision should be based on the criteria, many of 
stipulated in the Bail Act (1982), many of which are included in these models. 
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the Adult Courts model includes one additional significant factor, namely a defence 
argument, which increases the likelihood of bail being granted.   
 
Discussion 
Three trained observers attended seven different courts in Perth to observe the first 
appearances of 648 defendants.  About 5% of these defendants had reoffended while on 
parole, in comparison to 24% of them who had offended while they were on bail for another 
alleged offence.  This latter figure is comparable to findings in England and Wales of 
offenders who commit crimes while on court and police bail (Brown, 1998; Morgan & 
Henderson, 1998).   
Given the differential treatment of juveniles and adults in the Bail Act (1982) it came as 
no surprise that relatively more juveniles (72%) were granted bail than adults (58%), and this 
is appropriate given their age and lack of maturity (Scott & Grisso, 1998).  Number of 
charges was the only variable that had a significant influence on the bail decision in the 
Children’s Court model.  However, this model had little explanatory power.  A factor that 
may have contributed to the lack of useful results is the low number of defendants in the 
Children’s Court sample and the consequent lack of rigour in the analysis.  It is also possible 
that the variables investigated in this study, that were selected on the basis of the provisions of 
the Bail Act (1982) and the literature on bail decision-making in adult cases, do not influence 
the bail decision in Children’s Court cases and that other variables should be considered.  
Future research about bail decisions in the Children’s Court should thus allow the 
construction of a model based on a larger range of more appropriate variables and employ a 
larger sample.  
As the Adult Courts and All Courts models are very similar, the All Courts model will 
be discussed. The logistic regression results suggest that, relative to the benchmark case, bail 
is significantly related to a number of factors.  The model suggests that bail is significantly 
less likely to be granted if any reasons are given by the magistrate; orders apply (prior bail, 
parole and other orders); no formal bail application is made; the defendant is attending the 
bail hearing in custody; there is a Schedule 2 offence.  The log odds of obtaining bail decrease 
with the number of charges.  The model further suggests that bail is significantly more likely 
to be granted if the defendant has legal representation; there is a bench warrant in place; 
there has been a breach of bail and/or the prosecutor is unopposed to bail.  We cannot 
explain the fact that those apprehended on a bench warrant and after a breach of bail were 
significantly more likely to have bail granted.  
The presence of a prosecutor argument does not make a significant contribution to the 
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bail.  As in other studies (Bamford et al., 1999; Bottomley, 1970; Friedland, 1965; Hucklesby, 
1996; King, 1973; Konecni & Ebbesen, 1984; Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Petee, 1994) the 
opinion of the prosecutors appears to be influential.  In WA this may be explained partially by 
clause 1(c) of part 3 of the Bail Act (1982) that directs the magistrate to have regard to 
“whether the prosecutor has put forward grounds for opposing the grant of bail”.  The 
arguments raised by prosecutors generally addressed legal factors, i.e. factors mentioned in 
the Bail Act (1982). Frequent prosecutor arguments included the seriousness of the offence 
and previous breaches of bail.  However, the prosecutor arguments that had a significant 
influence on the decision where not necessarily those argued most frequently.  The likelihood 
of bail is significantly lower when the prosecutor argues that the defendant had an existing 
order, that there is a risk of reoffending (clause 1(a)(ii) of Bail Act, 1982) and, or, that the 
outstanding offences are serious or numerous (clause 3(b)).  It is also notable that, as in 
Canada (see Kellough & Wortley, 2002), defendants are significantly less likely to be granted 
bail when the prosecutor argues that the defendant’s character is poor (also see clause 3(b)).  
A possible explanation for the significant association between no argument by the prosecutor 
and the refusal of bail may be that the prosecutor anticipates that the magistrate will not grant 
bail and therefore does not consider it necessary to submit an argument.   
The  finding that bail is more likely to be granted if the defendant has legal 
representation is in accordance with the opinions of authors who believe that legal 
presentation at bail hearings are of considerable importance and that unrepresented defendants 
may be disadvantaged (Barry, 1997; Bernat, 1984; Hucklesby, 1996; King, 1973).  It is 
encouraging to note that all the juveniles and 93% of the adults in this study had some form of 
legal representation at their first appearance.  
Bail is more likely to be granted in both the Adult Courts and All Courts models if there 
is any defence argument, but the contribution of this factor is only significant in the former 
model.  Arguments in respect of bail were raised by, or on behalf, of defendants in 60% of 
appearances in all courts.  Arguments were more likely to be submitted on behalf of 
represented defendants.  Relatively more defendants who did not submit arguments were 
granted bail than those who did, possibly because defendants and their representatives know 
bail is routinely given for certain less serious offences and therefore do not consider it 
necessary to argue the matter.  An alternative explanation is that bail was arranged prior to the 
hearing and that the defendants did not consider it necessary to submit arguments in support 
of bail. Defendants and their legal representatives often addressed extra-legal factors, i.e. 
factors not mentioned in the Act, during their arguments.  Examples of such arguments 
included those related to bail, such as assurances that the defendant would be able to obtain a 
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defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol.  The likelihood of bail being granted is 
significantly higher when defendants argue that they will be able to obtain a surety and that 
the offence is not serious.  These factors are mentioned in clause 3(a) and 3(b) of the Bail Act 
(1982) respectively.   The likelihood of bail being granted is significantly lower when the 
defence argument includes that the defendants was under the influence of drugs, exceptional 
circumstances or other comments.   The diversity of the arguments in the exceptional 
circumstance (e.g. having sick relatives) and in the other comments (e.g. domestic dispute) 
categories make any discussion of them difficult.   
Magistrates provided reasons for their decisions in 43% of cases and they were 
significantly more likely to give reasons when refusing bail.  The likelihood of bail is 
significantly lower if the reasons magistrates provide for their decisions include any of the 
following: seriousness of the offence; breach of bail in the past, violation of existing orders; 
the likelihood of reoffending; that the defendants was a drug user and other comments.   
The very low frequency for the drug use variable (n = 3) warrants a cautious interpretation, 
however, this result is in line with the significantly lower likelihood of bail when the defence 
argued that the defendant was under the influence of drugs (n = 37).  The other comments are 
so diverse that no inference can be made about them. As can be expected, and is predicted by 
research in other jurisdictions (see for example Hucklesby, 1996; Konecni & Ebbesen, 1984; 
Morgan & Henderson, 1998), most of the magistrates’ reasons are in accordance with the 
provisions of the Bail Act (1982).   
It is notable that personal characteristics of the defendants identified in the literature as 
related to bail, such as age (Barry, 1997; Morgan & Henderson, 1998), race of defendants 
(Bernat, 1984; Morgan & Henderson, 1998; Petee, 1994) and gender  (Bernat, 1984; Bottoms 
& McClean, 1976; Hucklesby, 1996; Kruttschnitt, 1984; Steury & Frank, 1990) were not 
identified as significant predictors for bail decisions in the All Courts model.  In contrast, 
factors mentioned in the Bail Act (1982), such as a large number of charges, a Schedule 2 
offence, and other orders made a significant contribution to bail decision-making.  
Finally, the importance of a formal bail application is underlined by the fact that the 
likelihood of bail being granted is significantly less in the absence thereof.  It is therefore a 
concern that at 12% of observed hearings defendants were remanded in custody without bail 
being debated or discussed in court.  This is, nevertheless, comparable with King’s (1973) 
finding that 9% of defendants in his sample were detained without any discussion of bail 
taking place in court. 
Though this project provided valuable information, it does provide a limited perspective 
of bail practices in WA.  First, the study only collected data in metropolitan courts and 
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what is happening in rural and regional courts16.  As the percentage of Indigenous people 
appearing in rural and regional courts are relatively high and as legal representation in these 
areas could be a problem, the results of this study cannot be generalised to these courts.  
Second, while studies based on observations provide a wealth of information, the findings 
based on data collected in this manner must be dealt with cautiously.  For example, Friedland 
(1965) believes that observers may influence magistrates.  This is possible, but given that we 
used different observers and collected information in a number of courts it is possible that the 
magistrate may in many instances not even have realised that an observer was present. 
Observations have also been criticised in “that they do not control for the inter-correlations 
that may exist between variables either at the design or the analysis stage of research. This 
means that the effect of one variable … cannot be discerned independently of the effect of 
another variable ...” (Dhami & Ayton, 2001, pp. 145-146).   To address this problem we used 
logistic regression techniques, though we are aware of the argument that human (magistrate) 
decision-making is unlikely to be the product of a “linear, compensatory integration of 
multiple cues that are weighted optimally” (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988, cited in Dhami & 
Ayton, 2001, p. 147). Thirdly, this study does not reveal whether defendants were able to  
meet the bail conditions and what the outcomes of their cases were. Finally, as the affirmative 
frequencies were low for certain arguments put forward by the prosecutor and defence and for 
some of the reasons offered by magistrates for the bail decision, the chi-square results should 
be interpreted with caution. 
Despite these limitations we believe that the data collected provide insight in current 
bail practices in metropolitan courts in WA.  The multivariate results do not provide much 
information about bail decision-making for juveniles but the fact that a high percentage of 
them were granted bail, is in accordance with the Bail Act (1982), that gives children a 
qualified right to bail.  
In conclusion, using observational methodology seldom used in bail research, this study 
reveals that in WA legal factors (i.e. those mentioned in the Bail Act 1982) that could be 
expected to be related to the bail decision, for example the number of charges, were 
significant in the prediction of bail. In contrast none of the extra-legal factors (for example 
gender and race) made a significant contribution to the bail decision.  This suggests that 
magistrates in WA are generally guided by legal considerations when making bail decisions 
in respect of adult defendants and that social bias does not play a major role. This study also 
reinforces the importance of legal representation and formal bail applications on behalf of the 
defendant to counter the pivotal influence of prosecutors.   
 17
                                            
16 The intention was to include these courts, however, a number of unforeseen practical 
problems necessitated the abandonment of this plan.   
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We believe that the data collected to date provides a good foundation for a future study 
to investigate what the respective outcomes were for defendants who were granted and paid 
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Table 1 
Other Orders and Legal Representation   
 
Children’s Court          Adult Courts          All Courts  
No. % No. % No.      % 
Prior Ordersa
Bail – prior 
Parole 
Community based ordersb
















































Aboriginal Legal Service 
Paralegal/Legal aid/Duty lawyer 
















































aAny orders were listed on the survey instrument. However, only one prior order could be encoded. In cases with 
more than one prior order, the first prior order was encoded.   These groups were compiled from the originally 
encoded prior orders.  The group ‘No reference’ refers to no prior order being recorded on the survey instrument.  
 
bCommunity based orders include:  
CBO: A Community Based Order as defined in part 9 of the Sentencing Act (1995). 
CRO: A Conditional Release Order as defined in part 7 of the Sentencing Act (WA) (1995). 
ISO: An Intensive Supervision Order as defined in part 10 of the Sentencing Act (WA) (1995). 
SRO:   A Supervised Release Order as defined in part 8 of the Young Offenders Act (1994). 
 
cRestraining orders include:  
MRO:  A Misconduct Restraining Order as defined in section 36 of the Restraining Orders Act (1997). 
VRO:  A Violence Restraining Order imposing restraints of the kind referred to in section 13 of the Restraining 






 An observational study of bail decision-making  
Table 2  
Prosecutor Arguments by Bail Decision (N = 631, df = 1) 
 
Prosecutor argument n 2χ      p 
No argument 293 5.676  .017* 
Any other comment 96 2.423  .120 
Seriousness of offence 91 3.351  .067** 
Breach of bail 74 0.945  .331 
Existing orders 62 16.116  .000* 
A likelihood of reoffending 34 8.558  .003* 
May fail to appear 28 0.305  .581 
Strength of evidence 26 3.232  .072** 
Number of offences 20 0.735  .391 
Serious outstanding or number of charges 19 4.082  .043* 
For safety of complainant 13 0.028  .866 
Residence 12 1.254  .263 
Poor character of defendant  10 6.491  .011* 
 
Note. 
*p < .05. 
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Table 3 
Defence Arguments by Bail Decision (N = 631, df = 1) 
 
Defence argument n 2χ   p 
 
No argument 252 16.244  .000* 
Able to obtain surety 147 4.342  .037* 
Any other comment by defendants 101 6.873  .009* 
Home environment 86 2.026  .155 
Willing to report 79 2.286  .131 
Children 73 0.193  .661 
Having treatment 55 0.030  .863 
Under influence of drugs 37 4.183  .041* 
Unemployed 35 1.328  .249 
Employed 35 0.070  .792 
Drug treatment  32 1.200  .273 
Sick 28 1.794  .180 
Confused/unaware 25 3.018  .082** 
Present offence is not serious 21 6.292  .012* 
Exceptional circumstances mentioned 18 7.613  .006* 
Under influence of alcohol 17 0.214  .644 
Able to meet bail 16 0.611  .434 
 
 Note. 
*p < .05. 













 An observational study of bail decision-making  
Table 4 
Magistrate Reasons by Bail Decision (N = 631, df = 1) 
 
Reasons n 2χ   p 
No reasons given 358 5.101  .024* 
Previous convictions 97 0.616  .433 
Any other comment 89 28.048  .000* 
Seriousness of offence 87 11.717  .001* 
Breach of bail 57 4.841  .028* 
Violation of existing orders 55 17.585  .000* 
May fail to appear 32 2.146  .143 
A likelihood of reoffending 25 20.190  .000* 
Number of offences 19 2.391  .122 
Serious outstanding or number of charges 17 1.079  .299 
Likelihood of imprisonment 12 3.409  .065** 
For safety of complainant 11 0.104  .748 
Strength of evidence 10 3.606  .058** 
Drug use 3 4.387  .036* 
For own protection 2 2.920  .088** 
 
 Note. 
*p < .05. 
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Table 5  





(N = 63) 
Adult Courtsb
(N = 542) 
All Courtsc
(N = 593) 
Any defence argument n.a. 0.734* 0.509
Any prosecution argument n.a. 0.046 0.152
Any magistrate reason -0.903 -0.921* -0.849* 
Female n.a. -0.133 -0.122
Indigenous n.a. -0.257 -0.290
11 to 12 years n.a. n.a. -1.702
13 to 17 years n.a. n.a. 0.576
18 to 22 years n.a. 0.475 0.536
23 to 27 years n.a. 0.659 0.686
28 to 32 years n.a. 0.701 0.660
33 to 37 years n.a. 0.652 0.790
38 to 42 years n.a. -0.323 -0.233
43 to 47 years n.a. 0.328 0.409
Prior bail n.a. -1.060* -0.752* 
On parole n.a. -2.541* -2.497* 
On special orders n.a. -0.152 -0.227
On other orders n.a. -2.154* -1.446* 
Legally represented n.a. 2.021* 1.725* 
No formal bail application n.a. -2.319* -1.814* 
Children’s Court n.a. n.a. 1.642
Breach of bail n.a. 0.681 0.735* 
Schedule 2 offence -0.762 -0.434 -0.557* 
Attending in custody n.a. -5.131* -4.113* 
Hearing adjourned for legal advice n.a. 0.001 0.191
Female magistrate n.a. -0.368 -0.349
Number of charges -0.089* n.a. n.a.
2 charges n.a. 0.637 0.583
3 to 4 charges n.a. -0.426 -0.059
5 to 8 charges n.a. -1.264* -1.017* 
9 or more charges n.a. -1.948* -2.065* 
Married n.a. n.a. -0.121
Bench warrant in place n.a. 0.867* 0.727* 
Prosecutor unopposed to bail n.a. 3.110* 2.858* 
Constant 2.414* 7.605* 5.961* 
Nagelkerke R2 0.242 0.687 0.638
 
Note.  The coefficients shown in this table give the partial effect on the log odds of bail being granted, holding constant all 
other factors. A positive coefficient will increase the probability of bail being granted, while a negative coefficient will reduce 
the probability of bail being granted. 
 
a The Children’s Court model only included the three variables with significant chi-square results.  Number of charges was 
entered as a continuous variable rather than the grouped variable in the Adult Court Model.  We observed 69 first appearances 
in the Children's Court, but included only the 63 cases without missing values.  
 
b The  Adult Courts model included socio-demographic variables, legal representation, arguments by the defendants (or 
lawyer) or the prosecutor, reasons by the magistrate and other court and offence variables as predictors. If the defendants 
presented any argument then any defence argument = 1, else any defence argument = 0. If the prosecutor presented any argument 
then any prosecution argument = 1, else any prosecution argument = 0. If the magistrate gave reasons then any magistrate reasons 
= 1, else any magistrate reason = 0. The benchmark age group is 48 to 77 years. The benchmark group for existing orders was 
no or unknown orders.  The benchmark group for number of charges is one charge only.  We observed 579 first appearances in 
the Adult Courts, but included only the 542 cases without missing values.  
 
c The All Courts model included two younger age groups and the court variable extra to variables in the Adult Courts model.  
 








Astor, H. (1986). The unrepresented defendant revisited: A consideration of the role of the 
clerk in magistrates' courts. Journal of Law and Society, 13(2), 225-237. 
Auditor General of Western Australia. (1997). Waiting for justice - bail and prisoners in 
remand (Performance Examination Report No. 6). Perth: Office of Auditor General 
of Western Australia. 
Australian Institute of Criminology. (2002). Australian Crime: Facts and figures - 2001. 
Canberra: Author. 
Backett, S. (1988). Suicide and stress in prison: Implications for a preventative strategy. In S. 
Backett, J. McNeill & A. Yellowlees (Eds.), Imprisonment Today (pp. 70-85). 
London: Macmillian. 
Bail Act of 1982 (Western Australia). 
Bamford, D., King, S., & Sarre, R. (1999). Factors affecting remand in custody: A study of 
bail practices in Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia. Canberra: 
Australian Institute of Criminology. 
Barry, M. B. (1997). A descriptive analysis of magisterial remand custody orders for 
offenders who receive a non-custodial sentence outcome. Unpublished BA(Hon) 
Dissertation, Edith Cowan University, Perth. 
Bernat, F. P. (1984). Gender disparity in the setting of bail: Prostitution offenses in Buffalo, 
NY 1977-1979. In S. Chaneles (Ed.), Gender issues, sex offenses, and criminal 
justice: Current trends (pp. 21-47). New York: Haworth Press. 
Bottomley, A. K. (1970). Prison before trial: A study of remand decisions in magistrates' 
courts (Occasional Papers on Social Administration No. 39). London: The Social 
Administration Research Trust. 
Bottoms, A. E., & McClean, J. D. (1976). Defendants in the criminal process. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Brown, D. (1998). Offending on bail and police use of unconditional bail (Home Office 
Research and Statistics Directorate Research Findings No. 72). London: Home 
Office. 
Carcach, C., & Huntley, C. (2002). Community participation and regional crime (Trends and 
issues in crime and criminal justice No. 222). Canberra: Australian Institute of 
Criminology. 
Clifford, B. R. (1979). The relevance of psychological investigation to legal issues in 
testimony and identification. Criminal Law Review, 153-163. 
Clifford, W., & Wilkins, L. T. (1976). Bail issues and prospects: Including a proposed 
guideline model. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 
Davis, C. E., & Davis, E. B. (1996). Information load and consistency of decisions. 
Psychological Reports, 79, 279-288. 
Dear, G. E., Thomson, D. M., Hall, G. J., & Howells, K. (1998). Self-harm in Western 
Australian Prisons: An examination of situational and psychological factors. Perth: 
Edith Cowan University. 
Dell, S. (1971). Silent in court. London: Bell. 
Dhami, M. K., & Ayton, P. (2001). Bailing and jailing the fast and frugal way. Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making, 14, 141-168. 
Dietrich v. The Queen. (1992). 177 CLR 292. 
Ebbesen, E. B., & Konecni, V. J. (1975). Decision making and information integration in the 
courts: The setting of bail. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32, 805-
821. 
Fitzgerald, G. E. (1997). Judicial activism and independence: One Australian perspective. 
South African Law Journal, 114(3), 486-503. 
 24
Fitzgerald, R. E., & Marshall, P. (1999). Remand in Custody: Towards a more objective basis 
for bail decision making. Paper presented at the National Outlook Conference, 
Canberra, March 1999. 
 
 
 An observational study of bail decision-making  
Foote, C., Markle, J. P., & Wolley, E. A. (1954). Compelling appearance in court: 
Administration of bail in Philadelphia. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 102, 
1031-1079. 
Friedland, M. L. (1965). Detention before trial: A study of criminal cases tried in the Toronto 
magistrates' courts. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999). Fast and frugal heuristics: the adaptive toolbox. In G. 
Gigerenzer, P. M. Todd & A. R. Group (Eds.), Simple heuristics that make us smart 
(pp. 3-34). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Goldkamp, J. S., & Gottfredson, M. R. (1979). Bail decision making and pretrial detention. 
Law and Human Behavior, 3, 227-249. 
Goldkamp, J. S., & Gottfredson, M. R. (1993). Judicial responsibility for pretrail release 
decisionmaking and the information role of pretrail services. Federal Probation, 
57(1), 28-35. 
Gordon, R. A., Bindrim, T. A., McNicholas, M. L., & Walden, T. L. (1988). Perceptions of 
blue-collar and white-collar crime: The effect of defendant race on simulated juror 
decisions. Journal of Social Psychology, 128(2), 191-197. 
Hannaford, K. (1991). The victim's second injury - Bail instead of remand (Conference 
proceedings No 6). In D. Challinger (Ed.), Bail or remand? (pp. 19-20). Canberra: 
Australian Institute of Criminology. 
Herzberger, S. D., & Channels, N. L. (1991). Criminal-justice processing of violent and 
nonviolent offenders: The effects of familial relationships to the victim. In D. D. 
Knudsen & J. L. Miller (Eds.), Abuse and battered: Social and legal responses to 
family violence (pp. 63-78). New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Hucklesby, A. (1996). Bail or jail?  The practical operation of the Bail Act 1976. Journal of 
Law and Society, 23(2), 213-233. 
Hucklesby, A., & Marshall, E. (2000). Tackling offending on bail. The Howard Journal, 
39(2), 150-170. 
Jones, N. (1999). Review of Admission to the Juvenile Remand Centre. Perth: Ministry of 
Justice, W.A. 
Justices Act of 1902 (Western Australia). 
Kellough, G., & Wortley, S. (2002). Remand for plea. British Journal of Criminology, 42, 
186-210. 
King, M. (1973). Bail or custody (2nd ed.). Nottingham: The Cobden Trust. 
Konecni, V. J., & Ebbesen, E. B. (1984). The mythology of legal decision making. 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 7, 5-18. 
Kraszlan, K., & Thomson, D. M. (1998a). The decision whether or not to apply for bail: What 
do defendants know? Paper presented at the First International Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Conference, June 1998, Winchester, England. 
Kraszlan, K., & Thomson, D. M. (1998b). The defendant and the criminal trial: Defendants 
knowledge of the decision making processes involved in criminal trials. Paper 
presented at the 18th Annual Congress of the Australian and New Zealand 
Association of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, March 1998, Melbourne. 
Kruttschnitt, C. (1984). Sex and criminal court dispositions: The unresolved controversy. 
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 21(3), 213-232. 
Law Commission. (1999). Criminal law: Bail and the Human Rights Act 1998 (Consultation 
Paper No. No 157). London: Author. 
Liebling, A. (1992). Suicides in prison. London: Routledge. 
Liebling, A. (1994). Suicides in young prisoners: A Summary. In A. Liebling & T. Ward 
(Eds.), Deaths in custody: International perspectives (pp. 391-409). London: Whiting 
& Birch. 
Morgan, P. M., & Henderson, P. F. (1998). Remand decisions and offending on bail: 
Evaluation of the Bail Process Project (Home Office Research Study No. 184). 




 An observational study of bail decision-making  
Myers, L. B., & Reid, S. T. (1995). The importance of county context in the measurement of 
sentence disparity: The search of routinization. Journal of Criminal Justice, 23(3), 
223-241. 
Nagel, I. H. (1983). The legal/extra-legal controversy: Judicial decisions in pretrail release. 
Law and Society Review, 17(3), 481-515. 
O'Malley, P., Coventry, G., & Walters, R. (1993). Victoria's 'Day in Prison Program": An 
evaluation and critique. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 26, 
171-183. 
Petee, T. A. (1994). Recommended for release on recognizance: factors affecting pretrial 
release recommendations. Journal of Social Psychology, 134(3), 375-383. 
Restraining Orders Act of 1997 (Western Australia). 
Rieskamp, J., & Hoffrage, U. (1999). When do people use simple heuristics, and how can we 
tell? In G. Gigerenzer, P. M. Todd & A. R. Group (Eds.), Simple heuristics that make 
us smart (pp. 141-167). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Robertshaw, P. (1991). Rethinking legal need: the case of criminal justice. Aldershot UK: 
Dartmouth Publishing Co. 
Roden, A. (1981). Foreword. In B. H. K. Donovan (Ed.), The law of bail: practice, procedure 
and principles (pp. ix - x). Sydney: Legal Books Pty Ltd. 
Saks, M. J., & Hastie, R. (1986). Social psychology in court: The judge. In H. R. Arkes & K. 
R. Hammond (Eds.), Judgment and decision making: An interdisciplinary reader (pp. 
255-274). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Scott, E. S., & Grisso, T. (1998). The evolution of adolescence: A developmental perspective 
on juvenile justice reform. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 88(1), 137-
189. 
Sentencing Act of 1995 (Western Australia). 
Spohn, C. C. (1995). Courts, sentences, and prisons. Daedalus, 124(1), 119. 
Steury, E. H., & Frank, N. (1990). Gender bias and pretrial release: More pieces of the puzzle. 
Journal of Criminal Justice, 18, 417-432. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1971). The belief in the "law of numbers". Psychological 
Bulletin, 76, 105-110. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. 
Science, 185, 1124-1131. 
Unnever, J. D. (1982). Direct or organizational discrimination in the sentencing of drug 
offenders. Social Problems, 30, 212-225. 
VanNostrand, M. L. (2000). Pretrial release in Virginia: Investigating the influence of 
defendant characteristics and community type on pretrial outcome. Unpublished 
Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Old Dominion University. 
Varma, K. N. (2002). Exploring 'youth' in court: An analysis of decision-making in youth 
court bail hearings. Canadian Journal of Criminology, 44(2), 143-164. 
Young Offenders Act of 1994 (Western Australia). 
 
 26
 
 
